|
Evidence on performance
Introduction
Manchester Metrolink
Sheffield Supertram
Other systems
Introduction
In this section some case studies to demonstrate the empirical evidence
of the use of light rail schemes as policy instruments will be described.
Schemes to be examined include Manchester Metrolink and Sheffield Supertram,
both in Britain.
Case Study 1: Manchester Metrolink
Manchester Metrolink Context
Scheme description |
Design, building and operation
|
Scheme expansions |
Light rail scheme in the county of
Greater Manchester in the north of England. Opened 1992.
Took over mainline suburban rail lines linking Manchester city
centre to Bury in the north and Altrincham in the south. These lines
are linked by an on street section, with a spur to Manchester Piccadilly
one of the main heavy rail stations in Manchester. Total length
31km. The part of the system described here is Phase 1. |
Phase 1 built under a DBOM
contract by a private consortium (GEC, Mowlem and AMEC). 15
year contract to operate awarded to GMML.
The original out-turn (final total including inflation) cost was
£140 million (£53 million from national government, £75 million
from local taxpayers, £12 million from the ERDF).
System has to cover operating costs no operating subsidy (Hellewell,
1993). |
Extension to Salford Quays opened in
December 1999, extended to Eccles a few months later. Total length
increased to 39.2km. Existing contract with GMML
terminated. New franchise won by Altram awarded 17 year contract.
New lines to Oldham and Rochdale, East Manchester, the airport and
Stockport being considered. |
More information about the system can be obtained from GMPTE's
website (http://www.gmpte.com/travelin/metrolin.htm)
and from the LRTA's website (http://www.lrta.org/Manchester/metrolink.html).
Maps of the system are available at http://www.gmpte.com/travelin/servicem.htm.
The effects on supply
The total length (39.2km) is small compared with the total road length
of 8413 km (DETR,
2001a) in Greater Manchester. The quantities of loaded vehicle-km by public
transport in Greater Manchester are shown in loaded light rail km, bus
km and train km in Greater Manchester (millions). This shows the quantity
of service offered to the public by each mode in a year. It can be seen
that the opening of Manchester Metrolink increased the supply of public
transport by about 1.5% when it opened. It can be argued that it did not
add significantly to the overall supply, but it has probably added significantly
in the corridors that it serves.
Loaded light rail km, bus km and train km in Greater Manchester
(millions) |
|
1990 |
1991 |
1992 |
1993 |
1994 |
1995 |
1996 |
Metrolink |
- |
- |
2.0 |
1.9 |
2.1 |
2.1 |
2.3 |
Bus |
131.3 |
128.9 |
133.1 |
138.4 |
146.3 |
146.9 |
137.6 |
Train |
8.0 |
7.6 |
7.1 |
7.6 |
6.4 |
6.4 |
6.4 |
Source: DETR
(2001b) (light rail), GMPTE
(2001) (bus and rail).
Note: The figures for light rail are for financial years, which have been
allocated to the year in which most of the financial year lies; the figures
for train are only for local services supported by GMPTE.
According to calculations by Babalik (2000) Manchester Metrolink uses
28% of its total capacity, calculated as the ratio of the average number
of passenger trips per hour to the total passenger carrying capacity of
the system per hour. The highest value out of eight systems examined in
Britain and North America was 52% for the Tyne and Wear Metro, and the
lowest was 13% for Sheffield Supertram.
The effects on demand
The demand for travel by public transport in Greater Manchester is shown
in number of journeys by light rail, bus and train in Greater Manchester
(millions) in the table below. It can be seen that total demand for public
transport in Greater Manchester has generally declined during the 1990s.
Patronage on Metrolink was 8.1 million in its first year of operation,
after which it grew to about 12-13 million where it seems to have stabilised.
Patronage on other rail services in Greater Manchester has been fairly
static. The fact the Metrolink overtook other rail in terms of patronage
shows that the latter is not a very important mode in Greater Manchester.
Bus is the dominant public transport mode and it is generally declining.
Even though it is likely that some users of Metrolink formerly used the
bus, Babalik (2000) showed that the introduction of Manchester Metrolink
did not seem to alter significantly the long-term downward trend in bus
patronage in Greater Manchester. This is partly because bus has such a
large share of the market. Even by 1998/99 Metrolink only had 5% of the
market compared with 90% on the buses.
Number of journeys by light rail, bus and train in Greater Manchester
(millions) |
|
1990 |
1991 |
1992 |
1993 |
1994 |
1995 |
1996 |
Metrolink |
- |
- |
2.0 |
1.9 |
2.1 |
2.1 |
2.3 |
Bus |
131.3 |
128.9 |
133.1 |
138.4 |
146.3 |
146.9 |
137.6 |
Train |
8.0 |
7.6 |
7.1 |
7.6 |
6.4 |
6.4 |
6.4 |
Source: DETR
(2001a,b)
An alternative way of trying to see the impact of Metrolink on the use
of other public transport modes is to compare what happened when it was
opened with the trends in comparable areas, as shown in the table below.
Number of journeys in other metropolitan areas outside London, 1991/2
- 1992/3 shows the changes in the numbers of public transport trips between
1991/2 and 1992/3 in other metropolitan areas. Total public transport
trips declined by 7% in the other areas, compared with a 1% decline in
Manchester, suggesting that Metrolink may have helped to sustain public
transport patronage in Manchester. Conversely, train patronage in Manchester
went down by 16%, whereas it only went down by 3% elsewhere, suggesting
that Metrolink may have attracted some users from heavy rail services.
(The heavy rail lines to Bury and Altrincham closed in August and December
1991 respectively, so this partly explains the decline in Manchester).
Bus travel in Greater Manchester declined by 3% over this period compared
with a 7% decline elsewhere, confirming the point made previously that
Metrolink has not had a serious detrimental effect on buses in Greater
Manchester.
Number of journeys in other metropolitan areas outside London,
1991/2 - 1992/3 |
|
1991/2 |
1992/3 |
Bus |
1217 |
1130 |
Rail |
120 |
117 |
Total |
1337 |
1247 |
Source: DETR
(2001a)
Note: the other metropolitan areas are West Midlands, Merseyside, South
Yorkshire, West Yorkshire and Tyne and Wear.
As well as trips, the total distance travelled can be considered, as shown
in number of passenger-km by light rail, bus and train in Greater Manchester
(millions), in the table below. It can be seen that in 1998/99 Metrolink
had 12% of the market, heavy rail 15% and bus 76%. The total demand for
public transport has declined over the 1990s, with bus declining fast,
heavy rail between 210 and 220 million in most years, and Metrolink growing
steadily. The faster rate of growth in total distance travelled than the
number of trips by Metrolink implies that the average trip length is increasing.
Number of passenger-km by light rail, bus and train in Greater
Manchester (millions) |
|
1991/2 |
1992/3 |
1993/4 |
1994/5 |
1995/6 |
1996/7 |
1997/8 |
1998/9 |
Metrolink |
- |
53.0 |
72.6 |
78.6 |
80.8 |
85.6 |
117.0 |
153.3 |
Bus |
1226 |
1117 |
1138 |
1141 |
1081 |
1040 |
1041 |
1009 |
Train |
241.0 |
216.0 |
222.4 |
197.4 |
212.2 |
215.4 |
214.8 |
197.0 |
Total |
1467 |
1440 |
1433 |
1417 |
1374 |
1341 |
1344 |
1323 |
Source: DETR
(2001a,b)
It can be seen, in the table below, that the opening of Metrolink coincided
with a decline of 2% in total public transport patronage in Greater Manchester.
This compares favourably with a 5% decline in other metropolitan areas
(see number of passenger-km in other metropolitan areas outside London,
1991/2 - 1992/3). It should be borne in mind that this was a period of
economic recession in Britain. Total rail patronage in Greater Manchester
grew by 12%, compared with a static position elsewhere, which suggests
that Metrolink helped rail travel to grow in Greater Manchester. Bus showed
a 9% decline in Greater Manchester compared with a 6% decline elsewhere.
Given that the number of bus trips in Greater Manchester went down less
than elsewhere, this suggests that a number of longer bus trips have been
lost to Metrolink, but there may be some more short trips being made by
bus, possibly because of increased seat availability because of the transfer
of some longer trips to Metrolink.
Number of passenger-km in other metropolitan areas outside London,
1991/2 - 1992/3 |
|
1991/2 |
1992/3 |
Bus |
5008 |
4685 |
Rail |
912 |
911 |
Total |
5920 |
5596 |
Source: DETR
(2001a)
Note: the other metropolitan areas are West Midlands (bus only), Merseyside,
West Yorkshire and Tyne and Wear.
It is possible to see how much Metrolink contributes to meeting the total
travel demand by mechanised modes. As number of passenger-km in Greater
Manchester by car, light rail, bus and train, 1998 shows, it is only about
1%. Car is overwhelmingly dominant, with 91% of the market. Public transport
has only 9%. Hence, in overall terms Metrolink is making a very minor
contribution to meeting travel needs in Greater Manchester. However, by
its nature, light rail is very location specific, so it will contribute
much more than this in the corridors it serves.
Number of passenger-km in Greater Manchester by car, light rail,
bus and train, 1998 |
|
Passenger-km (millions)
|
% |
Car |
13530 |
91 |
Metrolink |
117 |
1 |
Bus |
1041 |
7 |
Rail |
197 |
1 |
Total |
14885 |
100 |
Source: DETR
(2001a,b)
Note: the Metrolink figure is actually for the financial year 1998/9.
The car figure is based upon the annual road traffic on main roads figure
of 11 billion, of which 80% are cars and assuming a car occupancy of 1.54,
which is the national average, based on figures from DETR
(2001b).
This localised effect of Metrolink on the corridors it serves is illustrated
in change in rail demand in Greater Manchester corridors, 1990-93, in
the table below. The changes in rail demand in the Bury and Altrincham
corridors are compared with adjacent corridors. The Altrincham corridor
shows a 63% increase in the peak and 166% increase in the off-peak. This
compares favourably with a 15% decline in the peak and a 3% growth off-peak
in adjacent corridors. The Bury corridor is not so buoyant with a 3% decline
in the peak and 101% growth off-peak. This can be compared to a 21% decline
in adjacent corridors in the peak and a 109% growth off-peak in adjacent
corridors.
Change in rail demand in Greater Manchester corridors, 1990-93 |
Corridor |
Peak (07.00-10.00)
|
Off-peak (10.00-13.00)
|
Bury |
-3% |
+101% |
Altrincham |
+63% |
+166% |
Northern corridors |
-21% |
+109% |
Southern corridors |
-15% |
+3% |
Source: Table 3.1 in Oscar Faber (1996a)
Note: The Northern and Southern Corridors exclude the Bury and Altrincham
corridors.
According to Law et al (1994) patronage was higher on Metrolink than the
former heavy rail lines because of:
- Higher service frequency;
- Better penetration of the city centre;
- The fare structure on Metrolink made many journeys cheaper;
The peak period patronage on Metrolink on the Bury line was lower than
anticipated for two reasons:
- Price competition from buses;
- Higher fares than charged on the heavy rail.
It is relevant to consider where the patronage on Metrolink has come
from. As shown in the table below, comparison of estimated observed and
forecast sources of Metrolink patronage shows the estimated observed transfer
from the monitoring study carried out by Oscar Faber (1996a,b). It can
be seen that the majority have transferred from rail, mainly the heavy
rail lines that Metrolink replaced. Just over one quarter have come from
bus, and about 13% from car. This table does not include any trips generated
as a result of the existence of Metrolink. The table also shows the original
forecasts of the proportions. A comparison of the two sets of figures
suggests that the transfer from car and bus was underestimated in the
forecasts and that from rail was overestimated.
Comparison of estimated observed and forecast sources
of Metrolink patronage |
Mode |
Estimated observed
proportion |
Original forecast
proportion |
Car |
12.5-14.8% |
11.5% |
Bus |
25.8-28.2% |
19.9% |
Rail |
57.0-61.1% |
68.5% |
Source: Table 5.3 in Oscar Faber (1996a)
An alternative calculation of the modal origins of the Metrolink trips
from the University of Salford Monitoring Study is shown in estimated
annual Metrolink patronage (millions) by previous mode, as shown in the
table below This makes the comparison with the situation that was expected
to have occurred if the Bury and Altrincham lines had still been operated
as heavy rail. This is used rather than the 'before' situation because
there was a gap of several months when neither heavy nor light rail operated
on these lines and a high quality bus service was operated, which may
have influenced travellers' modal choice in the medium term. They estimate
that there are 4.5 million more trips on Metrolink than would have used
the heavy rail lines that they replaced. Of these, 2.6 million (58%) were
previously car trips, 36% were bus trips, 4% used other rail lines, and
4% were not made previously.
Estimated annual Metrolink patronage (millions) by
previous mode |
|
Metrolink forecast
|
Metrolink actual
|
Control situation:
if Bury/Altrincham lines still had BR services |
Metrolink impact
|
Not made new trip |
1.3 |
2.5 |
2.3 |
0.2 |
Car |
3.3 |
0.7 |
2.6 |
Bus |
3.0 |
2.6 |
1.0 |
1.6 |
Rail |
7.6 |
3.5 |
3.3 |
0.2 |
Other |
0.0 |
0.2 |
0.3 |
-0.1 |
Total |
11.9 |
12.1 |
7.6 |
4.5 |
Source: Table 2 in Knowles (1996) from the Metrolink Impact Rail User
Survey 1993.
Whilst there seems to have been quite a large transfer to Metrolink from
the car, this does not necessarily mean that there will be a significant
decrease in traffic flows because some people who were previously deterred
from using their cars because of congestion may start using them. According
to Law et al (1994) there is evidence that car traffic has reduced in
the Bury and Altrincham corridors, except in the peak period in the Altrincham
corridor, where there has been little change. The effects are complex,
but at that time (1993) it seemed reasonable to conclude that there had
been some reduction in car use on roads parallel to Metrolink, but it
was impossible to measure the effect precisely.
Oscar Faber (1996a) looked at the effects on highway demand in the city
centre, as shown in city centre impacts of Metrolink on highway demands,
shown in the table below. They concluded that there had been a 1.8% reduction
in the number of cars entering the city centre in the morning peak and
a 0.7% decrease off-peak. They also concluded that there has been a reduction
in the number of parking acts: 690 long-stay and 520 short-stay.
City centre impacts of Metrolink on highway demands |
% reduction in cars entering the city
centre AM peak |
1.8% |
% reduction in cars entering the city
centre off-peak |
0.7% |
Number of long-stay parking acts likely
to have been removed |
690 |
Number of short-stay parking acts likely
to have been removed |
520 |
Source: Table 6.5 in Oscar Faber (1996a)
More recently Scheurer et al (2001) claim that Metrolink has taken 2.5
million car trips a year off the roads, equivalent to a 10% reduction
in traffic on the Metrolink corridor (but possibly releasing space for
other car drivers, so that there might be no visible effect on traffic
levels). According to GMPTE (1995) Metrolink may have affected the pattern
of car purchases in the area it served because between 1991 and 1994,
the number of cars per person dropped by 3% in the Metrolink corridor
compared with a rise of 5% in the county as a whole.
Table 20: Contribution to meeting objectives |
Objective |
Comments |
|
Reduction in car traffic should have
led to increase in economic efficiency due to increased traffic
speed and reduced congestion. |
Extra rail trips Metrolink carries
compared with heavy rail lines replaced should increase efficiency
through reduced disutility of travel for these travellers and users
of other modes experiencing less congestion. |
Metrolink covers operating costs (very
unusual for rail-based public transport (Babalik, 2000)) but a large
sum spent on developing system not recoverable through the farebox.
|
|
Reduced car trips compared to what
would have happened will have made the affected corridors more pleasant
places. |
|
Reduced car use will have reduced pollution,
but effects will have been small. At the time of building there
was concern over visual intrusion of poles to support electric cables
method used dictated by financial concerns (Mackett and Edwards,
1993). |
|
Metrolink attracted fewer peak work
journeys than expected, but more off-peak shopping journeys (Knowles,
1996). Assuming work journeys more likely to be by males and shopping
journeys by females, then Metrolink is offering more high-quality
journeys for females relative to males than forecast. |
|
Switch of some journeys from car to
light rail should have increased overall safety in Manchester (with
corridor specific concentration), but there is no direct evidence.
|
|
Little evidence of impact on office
market or retailing, but may have been due to recession at time
of opening (Law et al, 1994). Presence may have influenced development
of GMEX and Victoria (exhibition centres) in the city centre. Although
development may have gone ahead regardless (Mackett and Edwards,
1993). |
Sites in southern section of CBD
redeveloped for office and residential uses as a result of Central
Manchester Development Corporation and Metrolink may have helped,
but many declining areas served by Metrolink, hence it appears not
to be acting as a development catalyst (Babalik, 2000). |
No discernable effect on house prices
(Forrest et al, 1996). May be because house prices were fairly static
at time of investigation. |
Manchester Metrolink appears not to have had a dramatic impact on Manchester
in terms of development. It should be borne in mind that it opened at
a time of economic recession, so that not much development would have
been occurring then. It should also be noted that the two monitoring studies
were carried out in the few months after it opened, and much may have
happened since then. Furthermore, the annual patronage is over 14 million,
and it has attracted some motorists out of their cars. Perhaps most significantly
it requires no operating subsidy with fares covering 140% of operating
costs.
Manchester hosted the Commonwealth Games in 2002, and a modern public
transport system is essential in making a successful bid for this type
of activity, which in turn can lead to huge amounts of money coming into
the city and various developments. Putting it another way, this is a good
illustration of the catalytic effect that a light rail system can have
alongside many other elements. It is very difficult to unravel the contribution
of the individual elements, but they all need to be there.
According to Law et al (1994) the following features have reduced the
potential impact of Metrolink:
- Metrolink and bus services were not integrated (because of the deregulated
regime for bus services);
- No traffic management restraint initiatives on roads parallel to Metrolink;
- Car parks not provided at all Metrolink stations;
- Since 1992 car parking charges have been levied near Metrolink stations;
- Plenty of car parking available in the city centre;
- Land rezoning near stations to ensure land use aims were met, was
not carried out;
- Land was not bought near stations with the aim of having it redeveloped;
- No specific grants offered to encourage development.
Case Study 2: Sheffield Supertram
Sheffield Supertram Context
Description |
Design, build and operation
|
Lines running along corridors radiating
from the centre of Sheffield, a city in the county of South Yorkshire
in the north of England. Additional line into Lower Don Valley added
to system prior to construction. First line opened was 7km long,
extended to a total of 22km with the opening of the second line.
Also known as South Yorkshire Supertram or Stagecoach Supertram.
|
July 1976 Sheffield and Rotherham
Land Use and Transportation Study recommended a segregated passenger
transport system on 6 radial corridors. 1979 6 lines safeguarded
against conflicting development by SYCC.
1982-83 studies to consider alternative modes. 1984-85 technical
evaluation. 1985 private bill before parliament seeking powers
to develop and operate a system. Further bill in Nov 1988 for a
line to Lower Don Valley. 1990 Financial approval; two companies
set up by SYPTE
to own infrastructure and use assets under concession agreement
(with view to privatisation later) respectively. 1992-94 construction.
March 1994 first line opened from city centre to the Meadowhall
shopping mall just north of Sheffield. October 1995 full system
opened. December 1997 system privatised taken over by Stagecoach.
Changes in operating system followed, including new timetables and
fares package (Haywood, 1999). |
More information about Sheffield Supertram can be obtained from the website
http://www.supertram.com/info.html.
Information can also be obtained from the LRTA website at http://www.lrta.org/sheffield.html.
Maps of the system can be obtained from South Yorkshire Passenger Transport
Executive's website at http://www.sypte.co.uk/more/maps/supertram.html.
The effects on supply
Opening a new light rail system adds directly to the supply of public
transport in an area. The total length of 22 km is comparable with the
146 km of heavy rail route supported by SYPTE (SYPTE, 2000), but it is
small compared with the total road length in South Yorkshire of 5851 km
(DETR, 2001a).
The effects on demand
The annual level of revenue from patronage forecast for 1996 was 22.1
million: 17.1 million on Line 1 and 5.0 on line 2. The actual figure was
about 6.6 million at this time (Haywood, 1999). Haywood (1999) gives the
following reasons for the shortfall in patronage on Sheffield Supertram:
- Decline in bus use 24%
Competitive buses 12%
Supertram frequencies 8%
Supertram run times 8%
Supertram fares 3%
Park and ride 4%
New developments 4%
Unexplained 4%
Actual patronage 30%
According to W S Atkins (2000) the two biggest sources of error were assuming
that there would be a major transfer from bus to Supertram and assumptions
about trips from new developments. The former problem arose from the fact
that the rival bus companies decided to operate in a very competitive way,
in terms of both routes and fares, which meant that there was not the scale
of transfer anticipated. These problems have largely been solved by the
taking over of operation of Supertram by Stagecoach which is a major bus
operator (It was not the major incumbent operator in Sheffield at the time
of the opening of Supertram. Fox (1996) argues that the incumbent operator
wished to take over Supertram when it was privatised and so had an interest
in it being in a financially weak position). The forecast errors arising
from assumptions about new developments were symptomatic of the problem
of poor co-ordination between the city planners in Sheffield and SYPTE who
were developing Supertram (Fox, 1996). The route pattern was devised to
serve some high density developments. The three tower blocks at Herdings
Park, which are at the end of a short branch line, were emptied of residents
because they were in a very poor state of repair but the line was still
built. The Kelvin development which would also provide customers was demolished
rather than being renovated as originally planned, and the Norfolk Park
Estate has been gradually emptied so that it can be redeveloped at a much
lower density.
However it is also clear is that patronage is increasing steadily following
changes to the service pattern and fares, the introduction of conductors
to help overcome problems of vandalism, and improvements in the local economy.
Technically, it is a very good system, but the many problems have led to
delays in it reaching its potential.
As shown in the table below, total public transport demand in South Yorkshire
declined throughout the period shown, and the opening of Supertram has
not reversed this trend, but it might have slowed it down, since the decrease
levelled off in 1993/94 to 1995/96. Bus patronage has been in long-term
decline, and it is not obvious that Supertram has accelerated this trend,
a point confirmed by analysis over a longer period by Babalik (2000).
Heavy rail demand in South Yorkshire is low, and appears not to have been
affected by the opening of Supertram, which is not surprising given the
route pattern of Supertram.
Number of journeys by light rail, bus and train in
South Yorkshire (millions) |
|
1991/2 |
1992/3 |
1993/4 |
1994/5 |
1995/6 |
1996/7 |
1997/8 |
1998/9 |
Supertram |
- |
- |
- |
2.2 |
5.3 |
7.8 |
9.2 |
10.4 |
Bus |
177 |
176 |
166 |
163 |
158 |
150 |
144 |
135 |
Train |
6 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
Total |
183 |
182 |
172 |
171.2 |
169.3 |
163.8 |
159.2 |
151.4 |
Source: DETR
(2001a,b)
Note: Rail services are those supported under Section 20 of the 1968 Transport
Act.
The figures in the table above can be compared with the changes in patronage
on bus and heavy rail in other metropolitan areas at the time Supertram
was opened as shown the table below, in number of journeys in other metropolitan
areas outside London, 1993/4 - 1994/5. In the other areas there was a
small growth in bus use (probably associated with the improving economic
situation at the time) whereas in South Yorkshire there was a small decline,
suggesting that Supertram may have prevented a short-term growth in bus
patronage in South Yorkshire Heavy rail showed a decline in the other
areas whereas it was about constant in South Yorkshire at a very low level.
Number of journeys in other metropolitan areas outside
London, 1993/4 - 1994/5 |
|
1993/4 |
1994/5 |
Bus |
935 |
941 |
Rail |
109 |
100 |
Total |
1044 |
1041 |
Source: Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (2001a)
Note: the other metropolitan areas are West Midlands, Merseyside, West
Yorkshire and Tyne and Wear (Greater Manchester has been excluded because
of the introduction of Manchester Metrolink).
The table below indicates that most trips (55%) have transferred from
bus. 20% have come from car and 12% are new trips that would not have
otherwise been made. Given that patronage on Supertram is low, 20% transfer
from car would not make a huge difference even if no other travellers
started using their cars because of the resulting reduction in congestion.
Abstraction of Supertram trips from other modes |
|
% |
New trips |
12 |
Car |
20 |
Bus |
55 |
Other modes |
12 |
Total |
100 |
Source: W S Atkins (2000)
According to calculations by Babalik (2000) Sheffield Supertram uses 13%
of its total capacity, calculated as the ratio of average passenger trips
per hour to the total passenger carrying capacity of the system per hour.
This is the lowest value out of eight systems examined in Britain and
North America where the highest was 52% for the Tyne and Wear Metro.
Contribution to meeting objectives |
Objective |
Comment |
|
Increased range of transport options
in Sheffield, so may be meeting some travel needs more efficiently.
Little impact in terms of patronage, so little impact in terms of
reducing road traffic. |
|
No operating subsidy received. Did
not significantly alter long-term downward trend in bus patronage
in Sheffield (Babalik, 2000). Hence, Supertram has added to the
efficiency of public transport in Sheffield in economic terms. |
|
Small local effect on residential property
prices (Crocker et al, undated). Prices fell between 1988 and 1993
in anticipation of construction. After opening, prices rose for
property near the system, but not back to the 1988 level. N.b. analysis
undertaken just four months after opening. No discrete impact on
commercial or industrial property prices detected. No noticeable
effect on planning applications or land use detected. |
|
Reduced car trips compared to what
would have happened will have made Sheffield more pleasant, but
effect will have been small. Effects also localised along corridors
served. |
|
Negative impact on Sheffield city centre
(Babalik, 2000) first line opened took shoppers away from the
centre to the Meadowhall shopping mall. 35% decline in city centre
retail turnover (Rowley, 1995) trend exacerbated by opening of
Supertram. However, fact that the two centres are linked may have
boosted patronage. |
|
Environmental effects small. Concern
over visual intrusion of overhead wires at development stage, but
addressed in public consultation. Opportunity to improve local streetscape
taken during construction. |
|
Gender make-up of Supertram patrons
mirrors that of public transport users as a whole (W S Atkins et
al, 2000). Supertram 41% male, 59% female, bus 38% and 62% respectively,
all modes 49% and 51% (W S Atkins, 2000). |
|
Age profile similar to all public transport
users. Supertram popular with elderly people provided they can reach
a stop because they pay the same concessionary fare as on the bus,
but benefit from additional comfort of the vehicle and ease of access/exit
(low floor) (W S Atkins, 2000). |
|
Lowest socio-economic group had trip
rate of 2.5 per week, whilst other three groups had a rate of 2.7
per week. One third of Supertram trips by individuals in two highest
socio-economic groups, whereas only 25% of bus trips made by members
of these groups. |
|
Vehicles seen as easier to board than
buses and having more space for wheelchairs and to stow pushchairs
and bulky items. |
|
Any reduction in net road traffic as
a result of the introduction of Supertram should have improved safety,
but effect will have been small and potential localised. |
|
Supertram runs through area where comprehensive
regeneration project implemented by Sheffield Development Corporation.
However, poor co-ordination between two schemes. Supertram runs
along margin of new development with poor access from development
to stops (Lawless, 1999). |
|
Supertram has had positive impact on
citys image, especially in eyes of external agencies. Also useful
in citys tourist promotion programmes. |
|
Considerable disruption in city centre
and along Supertram route during construction had inverse effect
on efficiency and productivity of companies in the locality. New
road construction had a stronger impact on industrial and commercial
development proposals than Supertram (Crocker at al, undated). 12-15%
of land use change in three areas attributed to Supertram, but most
development likely to have gone ahead regardless, but may have been
brought forward in time. More positive image of Supertram since
opening should lead to positive impacts on businesses (Crocker et
al, undated). |
|
Little impact on labour market (Crocker
et al, undated). Some evidence on improved access to areas such
as Mosborough, served by system, and of people able to job search
over a wider area, but effects small. Line 1 might lead to 295 jobs,
line 2 between 380 and 1275 (jobs in local economy, not system construction).
Application for funding suggested Line 1 would create 1135 jobs
and Line 2 3000 (Crocker et al, undated). |
|
N.b. Supertram opened at a time of
economic recession, therefore little movement in local economy or
property market at the time. |
Other systems
Context
Reference has already been made to a number of light rail systems around
the World. In most cases, unlike the Greater Manchester and Sheffield
systems, specific monitoring studies have not been carried out, so it
is not possible to draw detailed conclusions about their impacts. However,
surveys of light rail and similar systems by Mackett and Edwards (1998)
and Babalik (2000) do provide some evidence. The Manchester and Sheffield
systems were included in both surveys and so will be included here where
appropriate for comparison.
Effects on demand
All the systems examined in the two surveys mentioned above are carrying
large numbers of passengers, and so have stimulated some demand. One useful
indicator of demand is how well actual patronage matches that forecast
since the forecast would have been used as part of the planning process
and to help determine whether the project would be worthwhile financially.
Forecast and actual patronage on a weekday for light rail systems in thousands
shows the forecast and actual patronage for a number of modern light rail
systems.
It can be seen that there are huge errors in the forecasting procedures.
Out of the ten systems shown, patronage was overestimated in four and
underestimated in six, with errors of up to 161%. The one Canadian example,
in Vancouver, was an underestimate by 36%. On the Manchester Metrolink
demand was underestimated by 25%, but as Knowles (1996) showed, the type
of patronage forecast was very different to the actual, with much more
off-peak travel and much less peak travel in reality than expected. The
forecasts for Sheffield Supertram were significantly out (see "The
overall effects of Supertram"). Forecasts for the Tyne and Wear Metro
were fairly close to the actual values, but the patronage declined after
this point, and was down to 126 900 by 1996.
Forecast and actual patronage on a weekday for light
rail systems in thousands |
City |
Forecast
|
Actual
|
%
difference |
Year |
Patronage |
Year |
Patronage |
Vancouver |
1996 |
100.0 |
1996 |
136.0 |
+36% |
Manchester |
1996 |
35.7 |
1996 |
44.5 |
+25% |
Sheffield |
1996 |
70.7 |
1996 |
18.7 |
-74% |
Tyne and Wear |
1985 |
219.1 |
1985 |
208.9 |
-5% |
Buffalo |
1995 |
92.0 |
1995 |
29.0 |
-68% |
Pittsburgh |
1985 |
90.5 |
1992 |
31.1 |
-66% |
Portland |
1990 |
42.5 |
1995 |
24.0 |
-43% |
Sacramento |
1987 |
20.5 |
1987 |
12.0 |
-42% |
San Diego |
1981 |
9.5 |
1981 |
12.0 |
+25% |
St Louis |
1994 |
17.0 |
1994 |
44.4 |
+161% |
Source: Mackett and Edwards (1998) and Babalik (2000), using information
from Pickrell (1990), Dunphy (1995), Warren (1995), Federal Transit Administration
(2000) and DETR
(2000b).
The four US systems in which patronage was underestimated, in Buffalo,
Pittsburgh, Portland and Sacramento, as shown in the table above, were
all constructed using some Federal funding, giving some credence to the
claim that patronage demand was often overestimated under these circumstances.
On the two other US systems patronage was underestimated: San Diego Trolley
which was initially built with no Federal funding and St Louis MetroLink
which was constructed after the funding rules were changed.
Babalik (2000) has calculated the extent to which the total capacity of
light rail systems is used, as shown in the table below.
The figures look low, in general, because they are averages over the whole
day, including reverse flows during peak periods. The highest value is
for the Tyne and Wear Metro, but this is high partly because during the
construction of the extensions, stations were designed to accommodate
only two-car trains instead of the original four in order to save money.
If the capacity of the original system were considered then 38% of the
capacity would be used. This suggests that the San Diego and St Louis
systems are the most efficient in terms of matching supply to demand.
They were both systems where the actual demand has exceeded the forecast
which probably explains the relatively high capacity utilisation: they
have more passengers than they were originally expected to carry.
Percentage of total capacity used on light rail
systems |
City |
% of capacity used
|
Vancouver |
38 |
Manchester |
33 |
Sheffield |
37 |
Tyne and Wear |
75 |
Sacramento |
33 |
San Diego |
55 |
St Louis |
45 |
Source: Babalik (2000)
Note: the capacity used is the ratio of the average number of passenger
trips per hour to the total passenger carrying capacity of the systems
per hour.
Effects on supply
No detailed information of the effects of the new light rail system on
the total supply of transport are available other than those already shown
for Greater Manchester and Sheffield. It is likely that in all cases the
total did increase, because, only if road space were decreased significantly
to allow on-street running, would it be possible for the development of
a new system to lead directly to a decrease in transport supply.
It is accepted practice in the appraisal of LRT systems in the UK to include
a "mode constant" in the modelled disutility or generalised
cost of light rapid transit use to reflect the improved quality compared
to bus that LRT represents. The mode constant is subtracted from the generalised
cost of each trip. For appraisals of Manchester metrolink, Leeds Supertram
and South Hants Rapid Transit the mode constants applied were 17.4 minutes,
15 minutes and 9 minutes respectively (Steer Davies Gleave, April 2002).
The mode constants are generally derived from stated preference surveys
and are likely to reflect the public's perceived superiority of LRT over
bus in terms of reliability, cleanliness, ride quality, personal security
and so on. Journey time is explicitly modelled elsewhere and, assuming
that the stated preference is well-designed, is not part of the mode constant.
This evidence suggests believes that LRT provides significant quality
and reliability benefits when compared with bus.
Litman carried out matched pair analysis of six US cities which suggested
that it is with large rail transit systems (heavy or light rail) have
significantly less per capita traffic congestion delay (i.e. more supply
of road space) than similar sized cities that have small or no rail transit.
The results are presented in the figure below.
Annual per capita congestion delay, matched pair analysis of US
cities
Other Impacts
Contribution to liveable cities and neighbourhoods
Tram projects are often associated with a great deal of improvement of
the urban domain, in Montpellier this formed part of the strategy for
convincing the public and business community that the tram would be beneficial
(Hylen and Pharaoh 2002). Whilst a tram scheme may provide the impetus
for such landscaping to occur and may also make it more politically acceptable
to reduce road space dedicated to private vehicles, it may nonetheless
not be appropriate to attribute these benefits to the tram itself. Whilst
it seems intuitively obvious that building a modern, efficient, not polluting
(at source) public transport system should help to make cities and neighbourhoods
more liveable, the direct evidence of their doing so is very sparse.
Contribution to equity and social inclusion
In Manchester and Sheffield there was some evidence of use by the elderly
and other off-peak users, but there is little direct evidence of light
rail schemes helping to increase social inclusion in terms of providing
travel opportunities for those suffering from social deprivation. The
systems in Croydon, Tyne and Wear and the West Midlands have all been
designed to provide access from areas of high unemployment to areas with
vacant jobs, but there is no evidence on how successful they have been.
There is the example of Los Angeles (Wachs, 1993) where funding was transferred
from bus services in the inner city serving low-income households to subsidise
the light rail system serving high-income households because it could
not cover its operating costs, thereby leading to a loss of equity.
Many light rail systems run from outer prosperous areas to the city centre,
passing through inner urban areas which house low-income households. In
some cases, for example, Vancouver, San Jose and Rouen, the systems were
used as catalysts to help regeneration which can lead to jobs and investment
in infrastructure in these areas. Generally this involves using complementary
policies to help in the regeneration process, and it may be these policies
which actually help reduce social exclusion by offering jobs and so providing
income, but the light rail scheme is required as the catalyst.
In summary, light rail schemes can be used to help reduce social exclusion,
but this may well be indirectly through increasing investment in deprived
areas leading to economic regeneration rather than directly as a form
of public transport.
Contribution to safety
Light rail is very safe compared to the car both for users and non-users
and so its introduction into an area should increase the overall safety
of the area as people transfer from the less safe mode. Litman categorised
the 50 largest US cities into those with a large rail system, a small
rail system, and bus-only, as shown in the table below.
|
Large rail system |
Small rail system |
Bus only |
50 largest US cities |
7.46 |
9.99 |
11.72 |
The analysis lumps together heavy and light rail but that does not significantly
reduce its relevance here.
Contribution to economic growth
The stimulation of development is a key objective for the building of
many light rail systems. A new light rail system will not, on its own,
induce development, but it can form part of a package to facilitate development.
It plays several roles in the process: it provides a modern, efficient
way for residents to reach jobs outside the area, it provides access into
the area for workers, shoppers and those on leisure trips, it demonstrates
a commitment to the area by various levels of government, it provides
a useful theme for marketing the area, and so on. In order to implement
these concepts there needs to be investment in housing, jobs, shops and
leisure facilities. Most of this will be by the private sector which will
see the commitment made by the public sector to the light rail system
and will recognise that the system will convey workers and customers in
a suitably high technology style, that a bus simply would not do. In this
regard LRT's lack of flexibility when compared with bus is a positive
asset because developers can be confident that once the LRT infrastructure
is in place high quality services will be run for a very long time. Bus
services on the other hand (particularly in a deregulated market) can
be altered on a yearly or even monthly basis. In order to start the development
process off, incentives of various sorts may have to be offered, such
as tax reductions or reductions in planning restrictions. These issues
of complementary policies are discussed in the next section, but it is
important to note here that light rail has a role to play in the urban
development process along with other policy instruments.
In terms of the systems examined here, neither Manchester Metrolink nor
Sheffield Supertram seem to have had much impact in terms of development.
There are at least two reasons why this may be the case: from about 1989
to about 1994, Britain was in economic recession, so there would not be
much happening in the form of development with or without light rail,
and secondly, the survey work was carried out within a few months of the
opening of the system, and it could take several years for definite evidence
of development induced by the light rail system to show.
Evidence of development impacts were found for the new systems in St
Louis, San Diego, San Jose, Portland, Calgary, Vancouver, Rouen and Tyne
and Wear. In these cases complementary policies were used and there have
been at least some years since they opened when their national economies
have not been in recession.
Some other systems, those in Baltimore, Los Angeles and Sacramento, have
not induced development to any significant degree, and are regarded as
generally not very successful (Babalik, 2000, Mackett and Babalik, 2001a).
It can be seen that light rail systems can be used with complementary
policies to stimulate development in particular areas. In some cases this
may be simply a matter of shifting development from one area to another,
and therefore not necessarily adding to the overall level of economic
development in the city. In other cases, it may be making the city served
by the light rail system more attractive than other cities without such
a system, and so adding to economic growth locally, but not at a regional
or national scale. That may not matter if it is desired to stimulate development
in a particular area, for example to help 'kick-start' a major regeneration
process.
Contribution to meeting objectives |
Objective |
Comment |
|
Evidence presented suggests that cities with rail systems
tend to have lower levels of congestion. It is accepted practice to
apply a factor to reflect the improved quality of light rail over
bus when modelling its impacts. This practice is based on numerous
stated preference surveys were respondents indicate a preference for
light rail over bus. |
|
Tram projects are often associated with more general improvements
in the urban domain but it may not be appropriate to attribute these
improvements to the tram scheme itself. Where there is transfer from
car it is likely to provide some improvements in liveability. |
|
Where there is transfer from car there is likely to be a net reduction
in CO2 and local pollutants. |
|
Some evidence of LRT forming part of a package that has led to regeneration
of a particular area. |
|
If a system achieves transfer from car then accident rates will
reduce. Evidence from US cities suggests that those with rail systems
tend to have lower traffic fatalities per head of population. |
|
The evidence suggests that the other complimentary policies are
in place then and LRT can help stimulate economic growth in an area.
It is not clear whether this represents a redistribution of growth
or a net increase. |
|