The most comprehensive study is a 2002 report on the parking policies
of Amsterdam from the IMPRINT EU project (van der Schaaf, 2002). The parking
pricing strategy is one part of an integrated strategy (including Park
and Ride) to reduce the number of car kilometres in the central area by
20% between 1995 and 2005. The parking charges have been phased in from
the city centre outwards since 1991. In October 2002, almost the entire
area inside the inner ring-road was covered.
Residents and businesses pay parking tax by purchasing a permit. The
permit tariffs for residents and businesses are linked to the cost of
administration and enforcement. There is however a gap between permit
fees and cost of enforcement. It would not be politically acceptable to
close the gap so fee rises are in line with enforcement costs (i.e. the
gap is not allowed to grow). Greater enforcement efforts go into the city
centre and this is reflected in a higher permit cost. Business permits
are 160% the cost of residents permits to take account of redeemable tax
benefits so net costs are the same.
Where parking pricing is introduced it is, as a minimum from 9am to 7pm
Monday to Saturday. Further extensions to Sunday and overnight are possible.
The initial fee in the inner city was €1/hour. The current basis
for the hourly parking meter tariff is €3.40 in tariff area A, €2
in tariff area B and €1.1 in tariff area C. The report states that
“permit tariffs have no influence on parking behaviour but the parking
meter tariffs do” (p9). After the introduction of paid parking,
the majority of commuters either sought another parking place or chose
another mode of transport, tariffs do not impact much on business travel
but do on recreational travel. The author notes that people become accustomed
to the parking prices after a while and prices have to be raised to maintain
the effects seen shortly after their implementation. Pricing is set to
try and achieve 90% use of parking spaces to reduce search time and to
give transparency to the tariffs.
Gross proceeds from parking in 2001 were €40 million. Enforcement
costs were about half of this amount. 16% of this goes to a central mobility
fund with the remaining 84% going to the city district in which it was
generated. All of the proceeds must be spent on measures that promote
the mobility plan.
The paper notes that the growth in car mileage in the city has remained
limited due to a slower rate of growth in jobs in the centre and reductions
of traffic in the inner city and old town where the parking restrictions
are in force. “The cause of this is the shifting of employment to
the area around the ring road and (parking) policy in the inner city and
old town. The lack of business location policy, paid parking and road
tolls in the areas around the ring road has made a sizeable growth in
car traffic possible in the area. The growth in outgoing commuting will
lead to a growth in outgoing car traffic. Many of the employees working
outside the conurbation have not experienced any limitation in the use
of the car. Traffic jams are in the other direction, paid parking and
business location policy are not under discussion outside the conurbation.
Those who commute into the city choose more often for alternatives as
a result of the car-restricting measures, the main alternative being public
transport.”
There was no reduction in the number of parking spaces.
The Amsterdam case study suggests that private parking charges (permits)
do not affect parking behaviour but that public parking charges do. However,
the relocation of firms to the area beside the ring road would suggest
that permits are influencing firms location decisions and as such are
affecting traffic flows.
Objective |
Comment
|
|
The reduction in
city centre traffic is likely to have a larger positive impact
on congestion than the negative impact on congestion from an increase
in traffic beside the ring road. There is therefore likely to
be an efficiency gain. |
|
The reductions in
car use will have contributed to a liveability improvement within
the city centre. |
|
The reductions in
car use will have contributed to a reduction in environmental
impacts globally and locally within the city centre. |
|
There was no discernable
impact on equity and social inclusion. |
|
There was no discernable
impact on safety. |
|
Efficiency improvements
might support economic growth. However, the relocation of firms
away from the CBD would suggest that any efficiency improvements
are outweighed. |
|
The
scheme was self-financing and more than covered the costs of implementation
and enforcement. |
Case Study Two - California
Context
The development of ‘cash-out’ schemes for
workplace parking has largely been stimulated by the 1992 parking cash-out
law in California, introduced on congestion and
air quality grounds. Essentially, free parking at the workplace is viewed
as a subsidy and employees are given the option of keeping their space
or receiving the cash alternative. In California this is mandatory for
firms with over 50 employees subject to a number of provisos – the most
important of which is that cash-out only has to be provided for rented
(and not company owned) spaces (Shoup, 1997).
Demand
Impacts
A survey of eight firms implementing cash-out
in California found that the number of single occupancy
commuting vehicles fell by an average of 17% with vehicle miles falling
by 12%. Research from the US has made some attempt to quantify
the impacts of parking pricing schemes on workplace parking. In 1982,
employees classed as non-essential drivers (70% of employees) at a company
in Los Angeles were asked to pay $57.50 per
month to carry on using their parking space. Car poolers parked for
free and other drivers received $28.75 (50%) to park elsewhere. Single
car occupancy dropped from 42% to 9% whilst car pooling rose from 17%
to 58%. Public transport use fell. (Feeney, 1989). Higgins (1992) reports
reductions in single car use of between 12 and 40% at employers instituting
parking pricing for employees.
Supply
Impacts
There was no direct reduction in the number of parking spaces.
Contribution to Objectives
Objective |
Comment
|
|
The reductions in
car use will have contributed to an efficiency improvement. |
|
The reductions in
car use may have contributed to a liveability improvement. |
|
The reductions in
car use will have contributed to a reduction in environmental
impacts both global and locally. |
|
There was no discernable
impact on equity and social inclusion. |
|
The reductions in
car use will have contributed to an improvement in safety. |
|
Efficiency improvements
may support economic growth |
|
No
cost information was given but it likely that the cost of implementation
and enforcement were covered. |
Case
Study Three – UK (various)
Context:
In the UK, there is no formal requirement
for such a scheme and no direct link between the provision of a car
parking space and the sums offered for surrendering the right to that
space. Enoch (2002) reviews a number of different parking cash-out schemes
that have been introduced in the UK to varying effect. The main
reasons cited for introducing such a scheme are: expansion of office
space on a constrained site, limited parking provision as part of planning
permission and concerns about staff retention in such constrained circumstances.
Demand Implications:
One option pursued with limited success
is one off schemes to buy back parking spaces, tried by Derriford General Hospital and BAA. At Derriford General,
regular parkers (3-4 days per week) were offered a one off £250 payment
plus VAT to surrender their parking permit. Only 7 out of 3500 have
taken up the option (although 25-30 have applied). In 1997, BAA offered
employees £200 to forego their parking spaces at Heathrow. 33 employees
(1%) took up the offer. In the summer of 2001, Stansted employees were
offered £110 but again only a handful of employees took up the offer.
The levels of financial rewards offered clearly fall short of employees
valuation of their spaces.
Southampton General Hospital and Orange, Bristol, have tried annual incentive
schemes to greater effect. At Southampton General, permit holders are
given an initial £150 and an annual payment of £96 to surrender their
space. Despite difficulties for shift workers in using alternative modes,
take up is 9% (551 out of 5911). Orange was only allowed 105 spaces for 700 staff
in its new offices in Bristol. Staff that worked at the previous
office were offered a four year package to give up the car with £1200
in year one (reducing by £300 per year). The company budgeted £0.5m
(~415 workers) for the measure in year 1. No data on travel responses
to this is available.
Other, less permanent schemes are also in operation. Vodafone, Newbury
introduced a monthly scheme in 2000 whereby any member of staff opting
out of parking is given an extra £85 in their pay packet. So far, the
incentive has attracted 1500 of the 4500 staff. The most flexible scheme
in operation is the daily reward scheme offered by Pfizer,
Kent. A £2 payment is
given to staff for every day that they do not drive their car to work
at the Sandwich site (£460 per year) [1] and £5 per day at the Walton Oaks site
(£1150 per year). This is administered through the security card system.
The estimated cost to the company is £0.5m annually. Around one-third
of staff do not travel to work by car – however, it is not possible
to correlate this directly with the parking cash-out scheme as it is
part of a wider commuter travel plan.
Contribution to Objectives
Large employers view parking as an important attraction to
staff, part of the package of employment. Employees also place a value
on their parking spaces, as seen by the very poor take-up of the one
off payment of up to £300. Annual, monthly and schemes that provide
daily flexibility appear to offer a greater incentive to drivers to
surrender their spaces, the latter providing much greater flexibility
for occasional ‘essential’ car drivers. The decision of companies to
offer incentives rather than to introduce parking charging is indicative
of their likely reluctance to pass on workplace parking levy charges
to employees were such a scheme to be introduced. The table below concentrates
on those schemes that have been successful in reducing car use.
Objective |
Comment
|
|
The reductions in
car use will have contributed to an efficiency improvement. |
|
The reductions in
car use may have contributed to a liveability improvement. |
|
The reductions in
car use will have contributed to a reduction in environmental
impacts both globally and locally. |
|
There was no discernable
impact on equity and social inclusion. |
|
There was no direct
evidence on safety but the reduction in car use would lead to
a reduction in accident rates. |
|
Efficiency improvements
may support economic growth. |
|
These
schemes are not self-financing and the exact costs will vary according
to the type implemented. The studies reported here are mainly
voluntary and as such will have cost money to implement. |
Case Study Four (information purposes
only) – Nottingham
Context:
A review of workplace parking charges in
the UK was commissioned by Nottingham
City Council (Rye and Ison, 2002). The study examined
eleven large employers that have introduced parking charges for employees
and visitors over the past decade. The sites are, without exception
public sector sites with all but one being hospitals or universities.
This perhaps reflects the more footloose nature of businesses and reflects
the size (>1,500 employees) of the sites experiencing problems. The
charges have been implemented for a variety of reasons:
·
Parking
crisis on site with demand outstripping supply
·
Planning
obligations
·
Part
of a wider transport strategy
·
Raising
revenues (one site)
The case studies are summarised in the Table
below. However, the study throws up a number of different permit systems
in operation. In some institutions, a higher fee guarantees you a parking
space (often of higher quality). In many instances, the permit only
allows a “license to hunt”. Most schemes operate with an annual charge
with some spaces available on the day as pay and display. Some charges
are also differentiated by income.
The authors point to irrefutable evidence
of overspill parking effects and note that “There is anecdotal evidence
that staff will walk as much as 20 minutes from free on-street parking
to avoid paying a charge; however, this is not quantified”. In one instance,
the employer was required to pay for the establishment of a CPZ around
the site.
The authors conclude that whilst there is
considerable opposition of parking charging in the first instance, most
opposition dies away shortly after the scheme begins, echoing experiences
in the Netherlands. Walters (1996) however reports
on strong opposition to a scheme in York where employees were asked to
contribute £16 per week to cover their parking costs. This is a substantially
higher charge than the schemes reviewed by Rye and Ison.
The review above does not provide any quantification of impacts of
the policies. However, given that the policies were almost entirely
introduced to reduce parking pressure and, given the evidence on overspill
effects, it can be assumed that the policies are impacting on mode choice
and parking location choices.
Summary of case studies (Source: Rye and Ison, 2002)
|
Years in place |
Reasons |
Speed of introduction |
Length of intro |
Install. Costs |
Staff charge |
Visitor charge |
Choice of car park? |
Income related? |
Exemptions? |
Part of wider TP? |
Modifi-cations? |
Overspill? |
Use of funds? |
Midlands Council |
4 |
n/k |
Big bang |
1 yr |
Low |
£16/mth |
n/a |
Y |
FT/PT |
Disabled |
N |
Y |
Slight |
n/k |
South east hospital |
10 |
Congestion on site |
Incremental |
1 yr |
n/k |
40p/day |
60p/hr |
N |
|
Disabled; vols. |
Y |
Y |
Y |
Parking; TP |
NCH |
6 |
Congestion on site |
Big bang |
6 mths |
n/k |
£55/yr |
£1/hr |
N |
FT/PT |
Disabled; vols. |
Y |
Y |
YY |
Parking; TP |
QMC |
6 |
Congestion on site |
Big bang |
1 yr |
n/k |
60p/day |
60p/hr |
N |
N |
Disabled; vols. |
Y |
N |
YY |
Parking; patients |
Northern University |
3 |
Lack of parking |
Big bang |
1 yr |
n/k |
£135/yr |
£2/day |
Y |
N |
Disabled |
N |
N |
Slight |
Parking; security |
Grampian NHS Trust |
2 |
Lack of parking; planning |
Incremental |
1 yr |
£300k |
70p/day |
70p/day |
N |
Y |
Disabled |
N |
Y |
YY |
Parking; security |
Midlands University |
N/k |
Parking congestion |
Bi bang |
18 months |
N/k |
50p/day |
50p/day |
N |
N |
Cleaners |
N |
N |
N |
Parking; security |
Robert Gordon University |
0.15 |
Lack of parking; planning |
B bang |
2 yrs |
£160k |
£1.50/day |
£1.50/day |
Y |
N |
Disabled; car-sharers; essential users |
Y |
N |
YY |
Parking; TP |
Scottish University |
3 |
"Wild" parking |
Big bang |
18 mths |
£280k |
£80/yr |
n/a |
N |
N |
Disabled |
N |
N |
N |
Parking; security |
Scottish Hospital |
3 |
Raise funds |
Big bang |
1 yr |
£300k |
£80/yr |
£1/day |
N |
Y |
Disabled; vols |
N |
N |
N |
Parking; patients |
Sheffield University |
5 |
Congestion on site; lack of parking |
Big bang |
2 yrs |
Signi-ficant |
£6 - £30 per month |
£2/day |
Y |
Y |
Disabled |
Y |
Poss. |
YY |
TP; Parking; security |
N/k = not known
Vols.
= volunteers
Case Study Five (information purposes only) –
Cambridge, Norwich
& York
Context:
In 2000, 152 businesses in the Cambridge, Norwich and York areas were
surveyed about their likely reactions to the possible introduction of
Road User Charging and Workplace Parking Levy schemes both for general
conditions in the city and in terms of impacts on their own businesses.
The survey also investigated likely future responses to such schemes
(e.g. relocation). In general, businesses felt that the Workplace Parking
Levy would have a smaller impact on citywide issues than Road User Charging.
As with charging, an overwhelming majority of businesses (72%) expect
a negative economic impact from the Workplace Parking Levy compared
to only 7% with a positive expectation. Most businesses indicated that
they would absorb the costs of a Workplace Parking Levy rather than
pass it on to their employees and/or reduce the number of parking spaces.
This would appear to support the findings from the evidence on cash-out
and workplace charging schemes described above. Just over one half of
businesses surveyed indicated that their next location decision would
be influenced by the introduction of WPLs. Businesses in the retail
and distribution sector are found to be less likely to respond by relocating
(Gerrard et al., 2001)
The introduction of parking restraint measures is a contentious issue.
Available evidence shows that the strength of the relationship between
parking restraint and urban economic vitality varies strongly with methodology.
Attitudinal and behavioural studies suggest large changes and aggregate
data suggests very weak relationships (Still and Simmonds, 2000). The
relationship between parking policies and economic vitality is an under
researched area.
Based on a 5 day, 46 week year with no use of a car park space